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I. Executive Summary 
 
Recent news stories about laboratory accidents in which students were severely injured 
and killed have brought much-needed attention to lab safety. Creating a positive safety 
climate on college and university campuses is very important in reducing accidents. At 
the University of Kentucky, all laboratories are inspected once every year, and the 
results are recorded in a lab inspection database. These data include the department, 
building, lab classification, type of violation, room number, and the name of the PI 
(Principal Investigator). I want to analyze inspections to find out whether department and 
the lab classification are significant in looking at violations. Knowing this will help safety 
officials provide better, more specific training to those who work in these areas, and will 
provide those in authority with better tools to reach people at the most appropriate level. 
Violations can be looked at as potential accidents and potential fines. Acting on the 
findings of these inspections is crucial in preventing accidents from occurring on 
campus. 
 
In looking at the idea of safety climate, I considered which available variables would be 
best to reach this concept. I thought about using building, but it is collinear with 
department. Departments to some extent share space in a building. Multiple 
departments may be housed in a building, or one department may be split between a 
couple of buildings. If I used this and department, my results would be difficult to 
interpret Departments are under the same leadership, and lab inspection reports are 
distributed to department chairs as well as the PI, and other safety officials. Lab 
classification is important because it defines the storage and use of chemicals in that lab 
facility. There are four lab classifications that range from broad use and storage of 
chemicals to no use or storage of hazardous chemicals. There are no data on specific 
chemicals used, or the type of experiments that are conducted. Looking at the 
classification was also the best way to look at potential risk with the available data. The 
question I hope to answer is: Do department and classification of labs affect the 
likelihood of violations? I looked at the average violations per inspection by department. I 
also looked at the average violations per inspection by classification. Fixed effects and 
random affects regressions were run with inspections as the unit of analysis, looking at 
classification and department.  
 
According to the regression, the null hypothesis that lab classification is unrelated to the 
number of violations can be rejected. The P-values are less than 0.05, which makes lab 
classifications statistically significant. The results indicate that the laboratories that are 
equipped to handle the most hazardous chemicals are more likely to have violations, 
whereas the laboratories that are more restricted in the use of chemicals have fewer 
violations. This may simply occur because there is greater risk in a laboratory where 
there is broad use of chemicals, as opposed to those where chemicals are simply to be 
stored. The coefficient increases steadily along with the classification of the lab. This 
reinforces the finding that labs that are equipped to handle more chemicals are more 
likely to have violations. Department is also an important indicator of violations. Even 
when the classification is accounted for, violations per department are statistically and 
managerially significant and vary by more than 0.5 violations above and below a mean 
0.678 violations per lab. This finding would allow further investigation and targeted 
training to departments that need it. I would also like to know more about the type of 
violations by department, to learn more about trends or possible causes. 
 
The Occupational Health and Safety Department (OHS) at UK has no authority to force 
labs to address any violations. Department chairs, any safety officials they designate, 
and most importantly, the Vice President of Research has enforcement authority. There 
must be procedures in place at the departmental level to ensure a commitment to safety 
that is perceived by employees and practiced in their daily work. Safety must be easily 
accessible to all employees. Proper equipment, information, and a climate where safety 
is the main priority are crucial. I recommend that the Vice President of Research receive 
a quarterly report of inspections by department and lab classification from OHS, since he 
has the authority to enforce lab inspection findings, and it is in his interest to make sure 
no accidents occur, and no fines are assessed to the University by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the government agency that sets the standard 
for occupational exposure to hazardous chemicals in laboratories. Department chairs 
and PIs already receive the inspections, but having additional oversight may improve the 
departments who rank lower in their inspections. Because reporting at the departmental 
level has significance, a simplified report can be created rather than one that lists the 
results of every inspection on campus.  
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II. Problem Statement 
 
Due to recent events in the news regarding accidents at university and 
college laboratories, lab safety practices have come into the spotlight. The idea 
that there is a “culture of safety” and “safety climate” that develops in work 
places, and particularly in university labs, is something I want to examine further. 
By using the dependent variable departments, I am examining whether certain 
departments have developed a safety culture that leads them to have fewer 
violations.   
Proper training and information are crucial to the safe operation of these 
labs where many staff, faculty, and students spend much of their time. Every 
person who works in a laboratory on campus is required to have safety training. 
Different types of laboratories require specific training depending on the 
responses to a training checklist on UK’s Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) 
website (Appendix 1). Another important component of safety is providing those 
in authority, such as the PI, department chair, dean, and the Vice President of 
Research, with the information they need in order to enforce safe laboratory 
practices. Lab inspectors from the Occupational Health and Safety Department 
(OHS) at the University of Kentucky (UK) must work with the departments that 
conduct research and teach students in order to inform them of potential 
hazards. Along with reporting, there must be consequences for failing to adhere 
to the rules.  
In this project, I will analyze laboratory safety inspections at UK. I have 
access to the database that OHS utilizes in reporting lab Inspections. I plan to 
use it to break down inspections by department and lab classification in order to 
determine whether they affect the likelihood of violations.  
This research should shed some light on patterns of violations at the 
University of Kentucky and allow OHS to better utilize its time and resources, as 
well as inform departmental stakeholders about their performance in inspections. 
III Discussion of Organization/Structure 
The data set from the lab inspection database has been maintained 
consistently over the three year period I am examining. These data are gathered 
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through yearly inspections on each laboratory on campus and entered into the 
database by the individual who inspects the lab. The lab is not contacted before 
the inspection, but the timing is fairly consistent from year to year. The first 
version of the inspection database was started in 2002, and an improved 
database began in 2009. Data from the three fiscal years I examine were 
exported and merged into a Microsoft Excel table to enable me to look at all three 
years in one location.  
The same individual has been conducting lab inspections over the last six 
years. To carry out an inspection, an inspector from OHS visits each lab and 
reports all violations to the PI, department chair, any safety official in the 
department investigated, the Director of OHS, and the Physical Plant Division if 
this is a facilities violation. OHS has a rubric that lists nineteen violation types 
and the criteria for each. See Appendix 2 for the list of all possible violations. 
Violations are broken down into the following categories: door signage, chemical 
hygiene manual, fire extinguisher, fume hood, eyewash, safety shower, 
controlled access, food, housekeeping, and labeling.  
 The violations are further broken down into categories: Serious Violations, 
Other-than-Serious Violations, Facility Deficiencies, Repeat Violations, and 
Willful Violations. Serious violations are a condition that could result in death or 
serious physical harm or major regulatory action against the University, and 
could result in OSHA penalties of $5,000 or more. Other-Than-Serious violations 
are conditions that could result in an accident or injury that is less than serious in 
nature. Repeat violations are serious violations that have been observed in two 
consecutive inspections (this does not include other-than-serious violations. 
Willful violations are observed in three or more consecutive inspections. Facility 
violations are problems with required equipment, such as an eyewash not 
functioning, or the facility lacks equipment that is required for the type of work 
that is conducted. This also includes a functioning fire extinguisher that has been 
inspected by a representative of the University Fire Marshal. The lab 
classification determines the equipment that is required for the work that is done 
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as well as the chemical use in a particular space. Table 1 below provides the 
standards that apply to different settings. 
Table 1. Safety Standards for Chemical Laboratories 
Chemical Lab (CL) 
Classification: CL-4 CL-3 CL-2 CL-1 
Safety Equipment/Systems 
Broad use 
of 
hazardous 
chemicals 
Restricted 
use of 
hazardous 
chemicals* 
Hazardous 
chemical 
storage 
only  
No 
hazardous 
chemical 
storage or 
use 
Broad use 
of non-
hazardous 
chemicals  
Broad use 
of non-
hazardous 
chemicals  
Broad use 
of non-
hazardous 
chemicals  
Broad use of 
non-
hazardous 
chemicals  
Sprinkler        
Supply and exhaust air 
systems      
Labs on 100% exhaust      
Fume hood        
Sink     
Eyewash        
Safety shower       
Portable fire extinguisher     
Controlled access (lockable 
door)     
Approved floor surface (no 
carpet)     
 
* Restricted use: In a CL-3 lab, the following hazardous chemicals (see Definitions) are restricted to 
closed systems (e .g., HPLC, scintillation counter, etc.): gases; volatile liquids or malodorous compounds; 
solids that may become aerosolized in a process; liquids or solids that may become volatile at elevated 
temperatures; or reactions that may generate any of the preceding. 
 
Note: CL-4, CL-3 and CL-2 labs must have sufficient HVAC controls to allow them to be maintained 
negatively pressurized relative to the corridor.    
 
IV Literature Review 
In January 2010, a detonation at Texas Tech University in Lubbock cost a 
student three fingers, severe burns, and eye damage (Vergano & Korte, 2011). 
Preston Brown was working with another graduate student when they decided to 
attempt to produce 10 grams of an explosive compound, which was 100 times 
more than an informal lab limit for research sponsored by the Department of 
Homeland Security (Vergano & Korte, 2011). There was no policy in place to 
require them to consult with a Principal Investigator (PI) before scaling up the 
experiment. The students who worked in this lab claimed that the use of goggles 
was a personal choice based on the perceived danger of an activity (U.S. 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2010). The resulting case 
study by the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) challenges 
the academic community to create a ‘safety culture’ in university labs. CSB found 
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that the Department of Homeland Security had not prescribed any safety 
provisions specific to the work being conducted. Safety accountability and 
oversight by the principle investigators, the department, and university 
administration at Texas Tech were insufficient (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board, 2010). There were gaps in communication and 
accountability between these bodies.  
 In 2008, a UCLA graduate student named Sheharbano Sangji, was 
burned over half her body when she was transferring air-sensitive chemicals (t-
butyl lithium) from one container to another. She was not wearing a lab coat, and 
the compound got onto her sweater and ignited. She died five days later of 
severe burns caused from this chemical (Christensen, 2011). In this case, the 
professor who supervised her as well as UCLA have had felony charges filed 
against them. UCLA could face up to $1.5 million in fines. Two months before 
this happened; UCLA safety inspectors had found more than a dozen 
deficiencies in the same lab, some citing the lack of protective equipment and 
proper storage of chemicals. The corrective actions were not taken before this 
accident occurred. Lab accidents at schools and colleges occur 10 to 50 times 
more frequently than in the chemical industry (Vergano & Korte, 2011). 
The CSB’s Case Study of the Texas Tech University explosion found that 
the university’s Environmental Health and Safety Department (EH&S) “had no 
direct communication link within the organizational hierarchy to an authority who 
could enforce EH&S’s safety inspection recommendations with the PIs. EH&S 
was not required, nor expected, to report its laboratory safety inspection reports 
and findings to either the Vice President for Research or the Provost” (U.S. 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2010). At UCLA, Vice 
Chancellors are responsible for implementation and enforcement of UCLA’s 
EH&S safety policy in all facilities and operations, and the Chancellor is 
responsible for the implementation of UCLA’s EH&S safety policy at all facilities 
and properties under campus controls (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board, 2010). The link that connects individuals with enforcement 
authority and individuals who are conducting the inspections appears to be lost.  
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Much of the literature regarding workplace safety places great significance 
on a safety culture or safety climate. The two concepts have a great deal of 
overlap. The safety culture is defined differently by varying sources, but most 
would agree to encompass commitment to safety, communication style and 
frequency between parts of the organization, competence, risk perceptions and 
attitudes, shared expectations about standards, open-minded learning, and 
external organizational factors. A useful definition of safety culture says that it is 
“the product of individual and group  values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies 
and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management” (Wright et al. 
1999). Similarly, definitions of safety climate are not all the same, but the key 
aspects include safety measures, arrangements, protective equipment, safety 
procedures, training, knowledge, the organization’s members, and behavior 
related to safety issues. Safety climate is defined as “a set of attributes that can 
be perceived about particular work organizations and which may be induced by 
the policies and practices that those organizations impose upon their workers 
and supervisors” (Wu et al., 2007) For the purpose of this paper, safety culture 
falls under the umbrella of safety climate and the term ‘safety climate’ will be 
used from this point on. 
According to research by Wu et al., factors that affect safety climate 
significantly include having a safety manager committed to safety, a safety 
committee, safety training, accident experience, and type of employee. This says 
that if managers take safety seriously, and employees receive training on proper 
procedures, then employees will perceive a stronger safety climate. Accident 
experience shows that a person who has experienced a workplace accident or 
has witnessed one will perceive a weaker safety climate. The perception of 
safety climate was also found to correlate with age and length of tenure since 
long-term employees are more likely to have witnessed or experienced 
accidents. Managers and supervisors perceive safety differently than regular 
employees, ranking the manager’s commitment and emergency responses 
higher than other employees (Wu et al, 2007). Beus et al. goes further and 
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shows that accidents in the workplace are more likely to affect safety climate 
than safety climate to affect accidents. Safety climate is not a one-way concept 
(Beus, 2010). If an accident occurs, the perception of safety climate goes down 
significantly not just for the individual who experienced the accident but also for 
those who are there to witness it. If the perception of safety climate decreases, 
accidents are more likely, and accidents decrease perception of the safety 
climate, causing a cycle to occur that could result in an increase of accidents. 
Beus suggests that the best way to prevent additional accidents is to follow any 
accident with training and retraining to improve the safety climate.  
At the University of Kentucky, individuals working in labs are part of 
departments. The department chair is in charge of these departments, and those 
who have authority in labs are the PI of the lab and any internal safety authority 
designated within the department. These people have a pivotal role in 
establishing the safety climate. A big part of that would be protecting workers 
from any potential threat discovered in a lab inspection. I would expect to find 
similarities in safety procedures, personal protective equipment use, and training 
utilized within  departments. This is because the department chair and PIs would 
be in charge. Of course, it is possible that labs operated independently by 
different researchers could differ.  Still, I expect departments to share levels of 
concern, training, and responsiveness to the reports of OHS. Training is provided 
by OHS, and there is a Chemical Hygiene Committee that meets monthly to 
discuss safety issues. If an accident occurs, it is required to be reported to OHS. 
Important components of a good safety climate are available at UK, and should 
be utilized. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was 
established by Congress in the Occupational Safety and Health Act and was 
signed into law by President Richard M. Nixon on December 29, 1970. OSHA's 
mission is to "assure safe and healthful working conditions for working men and 
women by setting and enforcing standards and by providing training, outreach, 
education and assistance". OSHA has tailored a standard for occupational 
exposure to hazardous chemicals in laboratories, which is often referred to as the 
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“Laboratory Standard” (OSHA, 2011). Under this standard, a laboratory is 
required to produce a Chemical Hygiene plan which addresses specific hazards 
in its location and its approach to them. This plan includes chemical procurement 
and storage, how to handle spills, personal protective equipment, housekeeping, 
proper signage, and information and training (OSHA, 2011).  
The University of Kentucky also has procedures it follows in terms of 
yearly inspections, and emailing department heads and PIs their reports. The 
chemical hygiene plan is located in each laboratory, and the chemical inventory 
is kept in an online format called E-Trax. This tracks chemicals from purchase to 
disposal (University of Kentucky Chemical Safety Committee 2011). This is all 
done in order to be in compliance with the OSHA’s Laboratory Standard. The 
University of Kentucky Environmental Health and Safety Division, which includes 
OHS, is structured such that the Vice President of Research has the authority to 
enforce the safety practices in laboratories above the authority of the department 
chairs. His ability to ensure compliance would depend upon having a well-
organized timely report that highlights the labs most at risk. With over a thousand 
labs on campus, a report such as this could ease communication between 
individuals and departments, and assist in enforcement, which is the key to 
compliance.  
V Research Design/Methodology 
The question I hope to answer is: Do department and lab classification 
affect the likelihood of violations? In narrowing down which variables to use I 
considered using building as a dependent variable. Perhaps PIs in a building 
behaved similarly, but building is collinear with department. Departments to some 
extent share space in a building. Multiple departments may be housed in a 
building, or one department may be split between two buildings. If I used this and 
department, my results would be difficult to interpret. Departments are under the 
same leadership, and lab inspection reports are distributed to department chairs 
as well as the PI and other safety officials. Lab classification is important 
because each lab facility’s classification dictates the storage and use of 
chemicals. I thought that looking at lab classification was also the best way to 
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think about potential risk, given the available data. There is not any information in 
the database regarding the type of experiments or the chemicals used. 
Also, when sorting the data, I made some observations. The database 
would benefit from having a dropdown menu of all potential entries instead of 
being entered by hand. If there were a dropdown, different spellings and 
abbreviations would not require cleanup in making reports by department, 
building, college, or class. For example, Agricultural Engineering is sometimes 
reported as Ag. Engineering or Ag Engineering, which makes sorting difficult. Lab 
Classification was sometimes entered as Class2 or Class 2. It was not easy to 
create a query in Access or Excel without cleaning it up first. If there were an 
accident or immediate need for a report, the effort to get the data prepared may 
take some time, especially in cases where large categories, such as building or 
department, are needed. Also, some of the fields were listed as other, or NA, or 
simply left blank in some situations. Vacant labs were left blank sometimes or 
sometimes marked vacant in the department field. Some of the inconsistencies 
were likely the result of the data being imported from two separate databases. 
There were rare occasions where a lab would be inspected more than one 
time in a year. This occurred very infrequently, and I did not remove each of 
these occurrences over the three year period examined here. They occurred for 
a variety of reasons. A lab may have been moving, or a new PI began working in 
a lab. These were not necessarily related to violations.  
There were also occasions where there is only one inspection in the three 
year period for a specific department. These could be labs that UK no longer 
inspects, such as BCTCS labs, or they became part of a different department 
over the time period studied here. If there are numerous violations in that 
inspection, that department as a whole may look dangerous, when we are only 
looking at a single inspection. There were also quite a few departments that had 
only one laboratory to inspect each year. While it may be only one lab inspected 
over the three years, numerous violations are cause to be concerned no matter 
how many labs the department has. 
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Ethical considerations include drawing attention to specific individuals. In 
some cases, there is only one lab in a department, which may simplify identifying 
that PI. While the Lab Inspection Database includes the names of every PI and 
room numbers, no names and rooms are mentioned in my research. No personal 
information about these PIs is in my research. The lab inspection is the focus of 
my research, not the PI. The PI is included in the database because any 
violations found are the responsibility of that person. By listing specific 
departments, the department chair, or other responsible individuals for the lab 
inspections may be easy to identify.  
The OHS Department gave me the data they collected from yearly 
laboratory inspections that were entered by hand into a database. The data I 
worked with originated from two very different databases that were consolidated 
for my use on this project.  
When sorting these data initially, I examined average violations per 
inspection. There were 2,702 violations in total in 3,980 inspections, an average 
of 0.678 violations per inspection. The maximum number of violations in one 
inspection is seven. Inspection is my unit of analysis. I made two bar charts. One 
illustrates average violations per inspection by department, and the other 
illustrates average violations per inspection by classification. The average 
violations per department varied drastically from one department to another. The 
top ten violating departments are shown in Figure 1. The classification chart, 
Figure 2, shows that the wider  the use of chemicals permitted in the facility, the 
average violations per inspection increase. The Access queries used in these 
charts are available in Appendix 3. 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 2
 
In order to estimate the effect of lab classification and department on violations,  
a regression analysis was estimated based on the equation.  
Ydl = b0 + b1xdl + b1x2dl + b1x3dl + b1x4dl + b1x5dl + (αd + εdl) 
The regression was run for fixed effects and again for random effects. This 
distinction refers to the method by which the departmental identities are 
controlled in the regression. Fixed effects use a set of 115 dummy variables for 
116 departments. Random effects assume the departments are part of the 
regression disturbance and are uncorrelated with lab classification. That is, 
departments using similar labs have no greater or lesser tendency to have 
violations in those labs. That assumption can be tested, and here, there is no 
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statistical evidence that departmental effects are correlated with the 
extensiveness of chemical use. So random effects, which assume no correlation 
between departments and lab classification, are acceptable here. 
 Departments have highly variable numbers of labs, ranging from 1 to 299, 
with a mean of 34.2. Note that no correlation is one thing, while no effect of 
department is another. In fact, departments are quite different, some having more 
violations than others, given the classification of labs that they have. This is 
estimated using random effects, and is an average over the labs that a 
department runs. 
 Fixed effects estimates are presented first. Lab classification has 
statistically significant effects. The r square is low, but there is statistical evidence 
that the more extensive the use of chemicals, the more violations, on average. 
Fixed Effects:  
     # of Inspections 3970 Labs per Dept     
# of Departments 116   Min 1 
R-Squared     Avg 34.2 
within 0.036   Max 299 
between 0.040       
overall 0.038       
     Total Violations Coef Std. Err t P>|t|      
Class 2 0.255 0.091 2.81 0.005 
Class 3 0.443 0.121 3.67 <0.001 
Class 4 0.604 0.089 6.78 <0.001 
Other 0.048 0.106 0.45 0.655 
_cons 0.251 0.085 2.95 0.003 
    
   S.D. of fixed eff 0.681 
   S.D. of disturb. 0.959 
   rho 0.297 
   (Fraction of variance due to fixed effects) 
 
 As noted, random effects are acceptable here because the correlation is 
low between departmental effects and types of labs. Random effects estimations 
follow. The conclusions concerning lab classification are unchanged. 
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Random Effects:  
# of Inspections 3970 Labs per Dept   
 # of Departments 116   Min 1 
R-Squared     Avg 34.2 
within 0.036   Max 299 
between 0.043     
 overall 0.039     
 
     Total Violations Coef Std. Err t P>|t|      
Class 2 0.247 0.088 2.80 0.005 
Class 3 0.440 0.118 3.73 <0.001 
Class 4 0.585 0.087 6.75 <0.001 
Other 0.015 0.104 0.15 0.884 
_cons 0.290 0.100 2.91 0.004 
    
   S.D. of fixed eff 0.516 
   S.D. of disturb. 0.959 
   rho 0.224 
   (Fraction of variance due to fixed effects) 
 
  Using random effects estimates, the departments are ranked according to 
the average number of violations given the types of labs they run. Figure 3 and 4 
show rankings of departments with the lowest and highest residual violations, 
adjusted for lab classification.  The mean is 0.678, so an effect of -0.5 or +0.5 is 
large relative to the mean. 
Figure 3 
Department  Dept. Effect on Mean 
VDL -0.594 
CAER -0.525 
Plant Pathology -0.516 
Vacant or N/A -0.498 
Other -0.454 
Pediatrics -0.451 
Surgery/Neurosurgery -0.448 
Environmental Sciences -0.407 
Pharmacy Practice & Science -0.376 
 
Departments in Figure 3 are less likely than average to have violations when they 
are inspected. Figure 4 illustrates the departments more likely than average to 
have violations when they are inspected.  
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Figure 4 
Department  Dept. Effect on Mean 
Exatherm, LLC 0.536 
Neurosurgery 0.547 
Mechanical Engineering 0.584 
Earth & Environmental Sciences 0.598 
Yaupon 0.701 
MRICS Research 0.720 
Brain Chem 0.777 
Mining Engineering 0.803 
Electrical Engineering 0.819 
Oraceuticals 1.032 
 
This research cannot explicate the reasons for departments being above or 
below the expected number of violations given the lab classification. There could 
be random events, good or bad management, or more or less effort to prescribe 
and enforce proper procedures, as illustrated in the literature review. What is 
clear is that departments differ by large amounts relative to the mean.   
VI Analysis and Findings 
 According to the regressions, the null hypothesis that lab classification is 
unrelated to the number of violations can be rejected. The more chemical use, 
the more violations, on average. The labs classified as other are used as 
refrigerator rooms or storage not related to chemicals and do not contain 
chemicals. The results indicate that the laboratories that are equipped to handle 
the most hazardous chemicals are more likely to have violations, whereas the 
laboratories that are more restricted in the use of chemicals have fewer 
violations. This may occur because there is greater risk in a laboratory where 
there is broad use of chemicals, as opposed to those where chemicals are simply 
to be stored. However, the risk of serious accident might also be higher. The 
coefficient increases steadily along with the classification of the lab. This 
reinforces the finding that labs that are more equipped to handle more hazardous 
chemicals are more likely to have violations.  
Department is also an important indicator of violations. Even when the 
classification is accounted for, violations per department are statistically and 
managerially significant and vary by more than 0.5 violations above and below a 
mean 0.678 per lab. The rankings presented here would allow further 
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investigation and targeted training to departments. It also would also be 
interesting to know more about the breakdown of these violations by department 
in order to see what may be affecting these violations. If a department is primarily 
housed in an older facility, perhaps this would make them have more facility 
violations which are less controllable. That would indicate a priority infrastructure 
need, given the dangers of stored chemicals. I would like to know more about the 
faculty in these labs and the chairs of these departments. I would like to know 
what the departments with fewer violations do with their lab inspection results as 
opposed to those with a larger number of violations. How do their actions differ, 
and what kinds of actions should be encouraged in order to lower violations? Is 
there more involvement on the part of department chairs? How do those with 
fewer violations approach safety? Could this be brought to other departments to 
create a stronger safety climate? I would also like to know if the average tenure 
in a department relates to the likelihood of violations. I think answering these 
questions would help gather even more information about the safety climate in 
the UK labs. 
 Given the literature, creating a strong safety climate on UK’s campus is 
very important, especially when dealing with laboratories on campus. Knowing 
that departments do differ across campus in their average violations, perhaps 
efforts in training and retraining could be targeted to those areas with higher 
numbers of violations in order improve the safety climate. There is a mix of 
faculty, staff, and students who must work together and ensure each other’s 
safety. Students must learn safe lab practices from responsible faculty and staff 
who make safety a priority and are clear about procedures and rules. This is the 
only way to make sure that accidents like those at Texas Tech and UCLA do not 
occur more frequently.  
VII  Recommendations/Conclusion  
 When considering safety in UK labs, it is encouraging to know that UK has 
safety committees, safety officials, and training available to employees. Despite 
these indicators of a good safety climate, there is only so much that OHS can do 
to ensure lab safety. OHS has no authority over labs to force them to address 
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any violations. Departmental procedures must be in place in order to ensure a 
commitment to safety that is perceived by employees and practiced in their daily 
work. Safety must be easily accessible to all employees. Proper equipment, 
information, and a climate where safety is the main priority are crucial. 
 I recommend that the Vice President of Research receive quarterly reports 
from OHS containing the top violating departments and lab classification of each. 
He has authority over departments to enforce lab inspection findings, and it is in 
his interest to make sure no accidents occur or fines are assessed to the 
University. Reporting based on department and lab classification has 
significance. Labs that have numerous violations and contain more hazardous 
chemicals should be addressed with greater urgency, because there is more 
potential risk in these labs. It is important to produce reports that make it easy to 
understand departmental and lab classification differences that exist, in order to 
determine where further attention should be focused. 
Limitations 
This research cannot identify the seriousness of violations nor the reasons 
for differences across lab classifications and departments, because the data 
show only the inspection and the results. The data are extensive but are only as 
good as the collection, coding, and maintenance of the data set, and in 
assessing violations, considerable amount of human judgment is involved. The 
only explanatory variables available are lab classification and department, and 
other variables such as experience of faculty and students, age of buildings, and 
lab activity (exactly what as opposed to how much) would be useful. None of 
these would eliminate differences but would explain them more clearly.   
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Appendix 1     http://ehs.uky.edu/rescklst.html 
Environmental Health and Safety 
Training Checklist 
 
The following questions are designed to help you assess the environmental health and safety training 
requirements of your research project. If you answer "yes" to a numbered question, then compliance 
will require "yes" answers to the questions that follow. These requirements are applicable to everyone 
who works on the research project-principal investigators, technicians, students, postdocs, visiting 
researchers, volunteers, etc. The training classes below are provided by the Environmental Health & 
Safety (EH&S) office. In addition to the EH&S classes, most of the areas require principal 
investigators to provide lab-specific or project-specific training for everyone working on the project. If 
you have questions, you may contact EH&S at 257-3845. 
1) Will chemicals be used?  
Yes  No  
If used in a lab, has everyone who will be working with chemicals completed Chemical 
Hygiene Plan/Laboratory Safety training?  
Yes  No  
If used somewhere other than a lab, has everyone who will be working in an area where 
chemicals will be used completed Hazard Communication training?  
Yes  No  
Has everyone who will be working with chemicals completed Hazardous Waste training?  
Yes  No  
2) Will radioactive materials be used?  
Yes  No  
Has everyone who will be working with radioactive materials completed radiation safety 
training?  (see below)  
Yes  No  
Research personnel whose work involves the handling of radioactive materials are required 
to attend: 
(a) On-Site and Beginning Radiation Safety prior to working with radioactive material. 
(b) Basic Radiation Safety within 4 months of completing (a). 
Training is also required for principal investigators, lab managers, and others who have 
significant radioactive materials experience and previous safety training, but are new to 
UK.   These personnel must complete: 
(c) Advanced Radiation Safety within 4 months of their authorization.  
Will X-ray be used?  
Yes  No  
Has everyone who will use X-ray completed On-Site and Beginning X-ray Safety 
Training?  
Yes  No  
3) Will human blood, body fluids, or tissues be used?  
Yes  No  
Has everyone who will be working with human blood, body fluids or tissues completed 
Blood-borne Pathogens training?  
Yes  No  
4) Will lasers be used?  
Yes  No  
Has everyone who will be using a class IIIB or IV laser completed Laser Safety training?  
Yes  No  
5) Are portable fire extinguishers available for use?  
Yes  No  
Has everyone who will be permitted to use a fire extinguisher in an emergency completed 
Fire Extinguisher Use training?  
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Yes  No  
6) Will respirators be used?  
Yes  No  
Has everyone who will be using a respirator completed Respirator Use training?  
Yes  No  
7) Will any equipment be used or serviced for which an unexpected restarting could 
cause injury?  
Yes  No  
Has everyone who will be working with this equipment completed Lockout/Tagout 
training?  
Yes  No  
8) Will a Biological Safety Cabinet be used?  
Yes  No  
Has everyone who will be working in or with a Biological Safety Cabinet completed the 
online training on using a biological safety cabinet?  
Yes  No  
9) Will the research project involve any of the following OSHA-regulated activities? 
Using powered platforms (e.g., lifts, scissors lifts, booms); working in a high-noise area; 
working at heights (>6 feet); transporting explosive agents; entering hazardous 
confined spaces (e.g., silos and manure pits); using powered industrial trucks (e.g., 
forklifts); welding, cutting and brazing; working in grain handling facilities; or SCUBA 
diving.  
Yes  No  
(If any of the above activities may be encountered during the research project, contact the 
EH&S office to conduct an analysis of the work and develop a training program.) Have all 
affected persons completed the training program designed by EH&S?  
Yes  No  
10) Will any "dangerous goods" be shipped?  
Yes  No  
Has everyone who will be preparing dangerous goods for shipment completed training on the 
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) hazardous materials regulations and the 
International Air Transportation Association (IATA) dangerous materials regulations?  
Yes  No  
("Dangerous goods," as defined by U.S. DOT, include explosives, compressed gases, 
flammable liquids and gases, oxidizers, reactives, poisons, infectious substances, radioactive 
materials, and corrosive materials.)  
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Appendix 2  
 
 
Door Signage 
 
 
CHP Manual 
 
 
 
 
Fire Extinguisher 
 
 
 
Fume Hood 
 
 
 
Eyewash 
 
 
Safety 
Shower 
 
 
Controlled 
Access 
 
 
 
Food 
 
 
 
Housekeeping 
 
 
 
 
Labeling 
 
Se
rio
us
 V
io
la
tio
ns
 
 None No Fire extinguisher  
 
Sash above working height 
during use 
 
Blocked/ 
obstructed 
eyewash 
 
Blocked/ 
obstructed  
 
 
 
Evidence consistent 
with eating and/or 
drinking in the lab 
 
Means of egress, i.e., aisles, 
doorways blocked  
 
Chemical containers not labeled 
 
Fire ext. discharged 
and not reported  
 
Alarm rendered inoperable via 
tampering 
Shower 
activation handle 
tied back 
Storage of food in lab 
area  
 
Illegible container labels 
Using hood when not certified 
 
Label incomplete 
• No chemical name 
 Fire ext. blocked 
 
Baffles obstructed 
 
Incompatible chemical utilized 
with standard fume hood 
• Perchloric acid 
           
O
th
er
-th
an
- s
er
io
us
 V
io
la
tio
ns
 
None Not completed Fire ext. not in wall 
mount 
 
Excessive 
chemicals/equipment in hood 
  Lab left unlocked 
and unattended 
 
 Chemical stored in aisle ways – 
obstructing egress and spill 
potential 
 
Food stuffs utilized for research not 
labeled for intended use, i.e., “food not to 
be used for human consumption” 
Incomplete Varying of degrees of incomplete 
• No SOPS for Select 
Carcinogens, Reproductive 
Toxins and Acutely Toxic 
Chemicals 
• No Chemical Inventory 
• No lab specific training 
documentation 
• Incomplete ID page 
• Information not current 
 
  Children in lab Slip/Trip hazards – power and 
extension cords, liquids on floor 
 
Outdated/incorrect 
information 
 Pets in lab Overabundance of combustibles 
 
           
Fa
ci
lit
y 
D
ef
ic
ie
nc
ie
s 
  Fire ext. not 
inspected annually 
Hood in alarm mode 
 
Non-compliant 
eyewash 
 
No shower 
 
    
Fire ext. not charged 
– “not in the green” 
 
Alarm not functioning  
 
No eyewash 
 
Non-compliant 
shower 
• No stay 
open valve 
 
Fire ext. not mounted No flow indicator and/or alarm 
 
Handle height 
greater than 69 
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Chemical Storage 
 
 
Flammable 
Storage 
 
 
Hazardous Waste 
 
 
Compressed Gas 
Cylinders 
 
Peroxide 
Formers 
 
 
PPE 
 
 
Electrical 
 
Training 
 
Other  
 
Se
rio
us
 V
io
la
tio
ns
 
Incompatible chemicals stored 
together 
• Acids/bases 
• Flammables/oxidizers 
• Organic acids/Inorganic acids 
• Water reactives/water or water-
based compounds 
• Oxidizers stored on 
incompatible shelf material 
Storage amounts 
exceed Solvent 
Storage Policy 
 
No label 
 
Unsecured  
 
Not dated for 
disposal in 
accordance with 
guide sheet 
 
Not wearing PPE in accordance 
with CHP PPE Hazard 
Assessment 
 
Damaged/frayed power 
cords 
 
  
Containers not sealed properly 
 
Flammables stored in 
unapproved 
refrigerator 
 
Label incomplete 
• “Hazardous Waste” not on label 
• No date as to when full 
• No name of contents listed 
 
Not secured properly 
 
Not disposed of 
by mfg’er 
expiration date 
 
Improper storage 
• Contamination of PPE 
• Degradation of PPE 
 
Use of appliances not 
UL listed for application 
• Blenders 
• Heat guns/hair 
dryers 
Containers compromised 
• Corroded 
• Cracked 
• Leaking  
 
Unapproved 
flammable storage 
cabinet 
• Three latch 
inoperable 
• Not FM or UL 
listed 
Waste not ticketed for pick-up when 
container full 
Exceeding limits for storage per 
UK policy 
 
 Improper PPE selected 
 
 
 Cabinet not closed 
 
Open containers of HW 
 
Toxic gases not in continuously 
ventilated hood or gas cabinet1. 
Would include but not be limited 
to: 
 
arsine, diborane, germane, 
phosphine, nitric oxide, methyl 
bromide, boron trifluoride, chlorine, 
chlorine trifluoride, dichlorosilane, 
hydrogen fluoride, nitrogen 
dioxide, phosgene, sulfur 
tetrafluoride, ammonia, boron 
trichloride, boron trifluoride, carbon 
monoxide, carbonyl sulfide, ethyl 
chloride, hydrogen bromide, 
hydrogen chloride, hydrogen 
sulfide, silane, and disilane 
 
Improper use of PPE 
• Improper type 
• Wearing gloves outside of 
lab 
 
Vent caps removed Evidence of improper disposal 
Incompatible gases stored together 
• Flammables/oxidizers 
 
 
Utilizing regulator as isolation device 
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Chemical Storage 
 
 
Flammable 
Storage 
 
 
Hazardous Waste 
 
 
Compressed Gas 
Cylinders 
 
Peroxide 
Formers 
 
 
PPE 
 
 
Electrical 
 
Training 
 
Other  
 
O
th
er
-th
an
- s
er
io
us
 V
io
la
tio
ns
 
 
Fume hood utilized for storage while 
actively being utilized for chemical 
operations 
   
Valve caps not on cylinders in 
storage 
 
  
Improper attire 
 
Ext cords utilized for 
permanent wiring 
 
All affected employees 
not received Chemical 
Hygiene 
Plan/Laboratory Safety 
Training 
 
No vacuum trap utilized 
with vacuum source  
    
Use of multiple power 
strips inline 
 
 
All affected employees 
not received Lab 
Specific Training  
 
Utilizing chipped or 
broken glassware 
 
No strain relief on 
energized cords 
 
 Improper disposal of 
glassware 
(deposited in regular 
trash in lab) 
 Overfilled sharps 
container 
No annual certification 
of biological safety 
cabinet 
 
1All gases that have NFPA Health Hazard Ratings of 3 or 4 
 All gases that have a NFPA Health Hazard Rating of 2 without physiological warning properties 
 Pyrophoric gases 
 
 
 
Violation Classifications 
 
Other-than-serious - a condition that could result in an accident or injury that is less than serious in nature 
 
Serious - a condition that could result in death or serious physical harm or major regulatory action against the University (penalties of $5,000 or more) 
 
Repeat - a like serious violation observed in two consecutive inspections 
 
Willful - a like serious violation observed in three consecutive inspections 
 
 
Note: When two or more individual violations are found which, if considered individually represent Other-than-serious violations, but considered in relation to  
each other create a condition that could result in death or serious physical harm or major regulatory action against the University (penalties of $5,000 or more),  
the individual violations will be documented as serious. 
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Appendix 3 
Average Violations by Class 
qryViolations by Class 
Lab 
Catego
ry 
CountOf
ID 
SumOfOth
er1 
SumOfSeri
ous 
SumOfRep
eat 
SumOfWill
ful 
SumOfFaci
lity 
Total 
Violatio
ns 
Avg 
Violations/Inspe
ction 
Class 1 166 39 19 3 0 0 61 0.37 
Class 2 1206 350 229 15 0 49 643 0.53 
Class 3 162 73 48 1 0 4 126 0.78 
Class 4 2165 885 835 49 3 43 1815 0.84 
NA 281 36 20 0 0 1 57 0.20 
 3980 1383 1151 68 3 97 2702 0.54 
 
Average Violations by Department 
qryViolations by Dept 
Dept 
# 
Inspection
s 
Othe
r 
Seriou
s 
Repea
t 
Willfu
l 
Facilit
y 
Total 
Violation
s 
Avg 
Violations/Inspectio
n 
Yaupon 1 1 3 0 0 0 4 4.00 
Brain Chem 1 2 2 0 0 0 4 4.00 
Clinical 
Nutrition/Rehab 
1 1 2 0 0 0 3 3.00 
MRICS Research 2 3 2 0 0 0 5 2.50 
Oraceuticals 6 5 8 1 0 0 14 2.33 
Exatherm, LLC 2 4 0 0 0 0 4 2.00 
Env. & Coal 
Technologies 
1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2.00 
Neurosurgery 5 7 2 0 0 0 9 1.80 
Earth & 
Environmental 
Sciences 
15 10 13 0 0 0 23 1.53 
Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation 
2 0 3 0 0 0 3 1.50 
Electrical Engineering 35 24 25 3 0 0 52 1.49 
Otolaryngology 3 3 1 0 0 0 4 1.33 
Surgery/ENT 3 2 2 0 0 0 4 1.33 
Merchandising, 
Apparel, & Textiles 
3 0 2 0 0 2 4 1.33 
Mining Engineering 38 30 14 5 0 0 49 1.29 
Escent Technologies 4 3 2 0 0 0 5 1.25 
Pathology 4 4 1 0 0 0 5 1.25 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
68 50 33 1 0 1 85 1.25 
Neurology 12 7 6 0 0 1 14 1.17 
Clinical Lab Sciences 29 24 6 2 0 0 32 1.10 
Physics & Astronomy 105 64 32 6 0 7 109 1.04 
Forestry 25 13 11 0 0 1 25 1.00 
Pharmacy Practice & 
Science 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1.00 
Clinical & 
Reproductive Science 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1.00 
Preventive Medicine 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 1.00 
General Surgery 6 2 4 0 0 0 6 1.00 
Power Generation & 
Utility Fuels 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1.00 
Obstetrics & 
Gynecology 
9 5 3 0 0 1 9 1.00 
E l d r i d g e  | 24 
 
qryViolations by Dept 
Dept 
# 
Inspection
s 
Othe
r 
Seriou
s 
Repea
t 
Willfu
l 
Facilit
y 
Total 
Violation
s 
Avg 
Violations/Inspectio
n 
3H 4 2 2 0 0 0 4 1.00 
Transposagen 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 1.00 
Psychology 6 4 2 0 0 0 6 1.00 
Biofuels & Env. 
Catalysis 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1.00 
Center for Nanoscale 
Science & Engineering 
6 1 5 0 0 0 6 1.00 
Toxicology 53 34 18 1 0 0 53 1.00 
Surgery/Cardiothoraci
c 
9 6 3 0 0 0 9 1.00 
Chemistry 299 132 132 14 0 8 286 0.96 
Chemical & Materials 
Engineering 
111 36 64 3 0 1 104 0.94 
Pharmaceutical 
Sciences 
189 86 72 1 0 14 173 0.92 
Entomology 122 23 83 0 0 1 107 0.88 
Rehabilitation 
Sciences 
8 5 2 0 0 0 7 0.88 
ASTeCC 27 12 11 0 0 0 23 0.85 
KY Geological Survey 24 4 16 0 0 0 20 0.83 
Physiology 118 57 36 4 0 0 97 0.82 
USDA 15 1 8 0 3 0 12 0.80 
Biomedical 
Engineering 
61 26 15 0 0 7 48 0.79 
Radiation Medicine 12 5 4 0 0 0 9 0.75 
Surgery/Urology 16 9 3 0 0 0 12 0.75 
Nutrition & Food 
Science 
42 20 11 0 0 0 31 0.74 
Kentucky 
Transportation Center 
15 8 3 0 0 0 11 0.73 
Microbiology & 
Immunology 
146 56 45 0 0 6 107 0.73 
Anatomy & 
Neurobiology 
78 40 16 1 0 0 57 0.73 
Markey Cancer Center 44 17 10 1 0 4 32 0.73 
Surgery 29 13 6 2 0 0 21 0.72 
Biochemistry 160 57 45 9 0 4 115 0.72 
Animal & Food 
Sciences 
70 18 32 0 0 0 50 0.71 
Ophthalmology 20 6 8 0 0 0 14 0.70 
Horticulture 44 20 9 1 0 0 30 0.68 
KTRDC 50 23 10 1 0 0 34 0.68 
Vacant or NA 3 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.67 
Anthropology 3 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.67 
Environmental 
Toxicology 
3 0 2 0 0 0 2 0.67 
General Clinical 
Research Center 
3 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.67 
Biological Sciences 198 81 33 3 0 7 124 0.63 
Center for Robotics 
Manufacturing 
13 6 2 0 0 0 8 0.62 
Pediatric-Research 10 1 3 0 0 2 6 0.60 
UK Extended Campus 20 7 5 0 0 0 12 0.60 
Cardiovascular 25 9 6 0 0 0 15 0.60 
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qryViolations by Dept 
Dept 
# 
Inspection
s 
Othe
r 
Seriou
s 
Repea
t 
Willfu
l 
Facilit
y 
Total 
Violation
s 
Avg 
Violations/Inspectio
n 
Research Center 
Dental Hygiene Clinic 5 2 1 0 0 0 3 0.60 
Kinesiology 12 6 0 1 0 0 7 0.58 
Plant & Soil Science 203 55 52 1 0 8 116 0.57 
SCoBIRC 90 24 23 0 0 3 50 0.56 
Pharmacology 56 15 11 0 0 3 29 0.52 
Pharmacy 29 7 8 0 0 0 15 0.52 
Anesthesiology 6 2 1 0 0 0 3 0.50 
Center for Biomedical 
Engineering 
2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.50 
Biotechnology 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.50 
Geography 4 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.50 
Preventive Medicine 
and Environmental 
Health 
2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.50 
Medicine 6 3 0 0 0 0 3 0.50 
Nanomite 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.50 
Scout Diagnostics 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.50 
Oral Health 52 11 7 2 0 5 25 0.48 
Civil Engineering 48 10 11 2 0 0 23 0.48 
Internal Medicine 153 42 25 1 0 3 71 0.46 
Veterinary Science 128 32 17 0 0 0 49 0.38 
Regulatory Services 80 3 22 0 0 2 27 0.34 
Advanced Genetics 
Technologies Center 
3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.33 
Radiography 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.33 
Naprogenix 6 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.33 
Center on Aging 132 27 16 0 0 1 44 0.33 
Education Curriculum 
and Instruction 
3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.33 
Pediatrics 36 9 2 0 0 0 11 0.31 
Oral Diagnosis 18 2 1 0 0 2 5 0.28 
CAER 80 3 19 0 0 0 22 0.28 
Orthopaedic Surgery 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.25 
Preservation 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 
Plant Pathology 60 3 10 0 0 1 14 0.23 
Dentistry 9 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.22 
Ag Engineering 95 8 10 0 0 2 20 0.21 
VDL 38 6 0 0 0 0 6 0.16 
Environmental 
Management 
7 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.14 
Other 59 2 2 2 0 0 6 0.10 
Vacant or N/A 38 3 0 0 0 0 3 0.08 
Tissue Bank 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Agronomy 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Advanced 
Semiconductor 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
KY Space Program 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Transposagen 
BioPharmaceuticals 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Tracy Farmer Center 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Vindico 
Nanobiotechnology 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
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qryViolations by Dept 
Dept 
# 
Inspection
s 
Othe
r 
Seriou
s 
Repea
t 
Willfu
l 
Facilit
y 
Total 
Violation
s 
Avg 
Violations/Inspectio
n 
Surgery/Transplant 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Surgery/Neurosurgery 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Surgery/General 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Central Supply 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Seikowave 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Environmental 
Sciences 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Orthopedics 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Outrider Technologies 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Physics 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Clinical Laboratory 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Pharmacy Practice 
and Science 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Pharmacy Laboratory 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Shared 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
 3980 1383 1151 68 3 97 2702 0.73 
 
